

Seminar in Comparative Elections

POLS 6322

Wednesday

5:30-8:30 p.m.

PGH 405

University of Houston

Fall 2018

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Office Hours: Friday 3-5 P.M.

This is a graduate-level seminar examining the interaction between voters and political agents across different types of political institutions and contextual factors. Students will read and discuss both classic readings and recent studies on a non-exhaustive list of topics. The scope of these readings will cover analytical models and empirical studies by political scientists and economists. The course requires familiarity with statistics (OLS) and research design.

The course is divided into four sections. The first part reviews the basic theories of electoral accountability and representation. The second part of the course is a survey of electoral institutions. We will examine the different ways in which votes translate into seats, and discuss the causes and consequences of electoral rules. The third part of the course examines the role of information on vote choice. We will read some examples of the literature on political media and electoral campaigns. The final part of the course covers a subset of issues undermining electoral quality and their consequences on public perceptions of integrity.

Requirements

Participation (25%): I take for granted that you have a basic interest in the material and an enthusiastic attitude toward participation. Therefore, I expect you to attend each meeting, do the reading thoroughly and in advance, and participate actively in class. You should be prepared to be called on to describe and discuss each of the assigned readings. Also, you will prepare and deliver a conference-like presentation about one of the assigned articles during the semester. I will provide more details about this activity during the first session.

Referee Reports (3×10%=30%): Students will write three 2-3 pages referee reports, each of them analyzing an article marked with an asterisk (*) from those listed below. These reports need to focus on any shortcomings of the reading, as well as propose realistic and constructive ways to improve the article. Each report should summarize the main argument of the reading in the first paragraph. The rest of the report must thoroughly explain the main problems in logic or evidence of the reading. Students should submit one paper for each of the sections II-IV of the seminar.

Research Proposal (45%): As a final assignment for the course, you will submit a 15-20 page research proposal displaying an original idea on one of the topics discussed during the seminar. The proposal should contain a brief survey of the literature of the theme and then describe a theoretical argument and a research design to test it. Throughout the semester, we will discuss how to work on this project, and you should submit a one-page outline of the paper by October 26, including the preliminary hypotheses, and a brief description of the research design. The research proposal is due on December 10 at noon.

Course Policies

Electronic Devices: Laptops are not allowed during class meetings. Make sure to print out the readings before class.

Deadlines and Extensions: Assignments submitted after the deadline will get a 10% penalty and another 10% for every additional 24-hour delay.

Disabilities: The University of Houston System complies with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, pertaining to the provision of reasonable academic adjustments/auxiliary aids for students with a disability. In accordance with Section 504 and ADA guidelines, the University of Houston strives to provide reasonable academic adjustments/auxiliary aids to students who request and require them.

If you have a disability that requires special testing accommodations or other classroom modifications, you need to notify both me after you contacted the Center for Students with DisAbilities (CSD).¹

Counseling and Psychological Services: Counseling and Psychological Services (CAPS) can help students who are having difficulties managing stress, adjusting to college, or feeling sad and hopeless. You can reach CAPS (www.uh.edu/caps) by calling 713-743-5454 during and after business hours for routine appointments or if you or someone you know is in crisis. No appointment is necessary for the "Let's Talk" program, a drop-in consultation service at convenient locations and hours around campus.²

Academic Integrity: There is a zero tolerance policy for plagiarism in any of the required activities for this course, and any violation will be penalized in the terms cited by the UH's Academic Dishonesty Policy.³

Course Materials

All the published articles are available through JSTOR. We will read most of the following books. I thus suggest that you purchase them.

Przeworski, A. (2018). *Why Bother with Elections?* Polity.

Shugart, M. S. and Taagepera, R. (2017). *Votes from Seats.* Cambridge University Press.

Lupia, A. (2015). *Uninformed.* Oxford University Press.

The rest of the readings are available via Blackboard or at the library.

I also encourage you to purchase the following book as a companion for the readings assigned in the course:

Angrist, J. D. and Pischke, J.-S. (2014). *Mastering 'Metrics: The Path from Cause to Effect.* Princeton University Press.

You will be expected to have completed all the items under *Read* before class. If possible, read the required material in the order indicated. *Further reading* includes articles referred to in class and related pieces on the topic that that will help you to prepare your qualifying exams.

I. Introduction

August 22. Seminar Motivation and Logistics

Read:

Przeworski, A. (2018). *Why Bother with Elections?* Polity. Chapters 1-5.

¹<http://www.uh.edu/csd/>

²http://www.uh.edu/caps/outreach/lets_talk.html

³<http://www.uh.edu/academics/catalog/policies/academ-reg/academic-honesty/>

Shepsle, K. A. (2010). *Analyzing Politics*. W.W. Norton & Co. Chapter 4.

Riker, W. H. (1982a). *Liberalism Against Populism*. Waveland Press. Chapter 1.

Borges, J. L. On exactitude in science. In *A Universal History of Infamy*. Penguin Books 1975, London

August 29. Electoral Accountability and Representation

Read:

Przeworski, A. (2018). *Why Bother with Elections?* Polity. Chapters 6-9, 12.

Przeworski, A., Stokes, S., and Manin, B. (1999). Introduction. In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge University Press, New York. Chapters 1-2.

Dal Bó, E., Finan, F., Folke, O., Persson, T., and Rickne, J. (2017). Who becomes a politician? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 132(4):1877–1914 (*)

Klašnja, M. and Titunik, R. (2017). The incumbency curse: Weak parties, term limits, and unfulfilled accountability. *American Political Science Review*, 111(1):129–148 (*)

Further reading:

Pitkin, H. F. (1967). *The Concept of Representation*. University of California Press, Berkeley

Fearon, J. (1999). Electoral accountability and the control of politicians. In Przeworski, A., Manin, B., and Stokes, S., editors, *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge University Press

Ferejohn, J. (1986). Incumbent performance and electoral control. *Public Choice*, 50(1-3):5–25

Besley, T. (2006). *Principled Agents?* Cambridge University Press

Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1997). Separation of powers and political accountability. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(4):1163–1202

Lee, D. S., Moretti, E., and Butler, M. J. (2004). Do voters affect or elect policies? Evidence from the U. S. House. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(3):807–859

Miller, G. (2008). Women's suffrage, political responsiveness, and child survival in American history. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(3):1287–1327

Key, V. (1966). *The Responsible Electorate*. Vintage Books

Strøm, K. (2000). Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. *European Journal of Political Research*, 37(3):261–290

Chattopadhyay, R. and Duflo, E. (2004). Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India. *Econometrica*, 72(5):1409–1443

Huber, J. D. and Powell, B. G. (1994). Congruence between citizens and policymakers in two visions of liberal democracy. *World Politics*, 46(3):291–326

Gottlieb, J. (2015). Greater expectations: A field experiment to improve accountability in Mali. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(1):143–157

II. Electoral Institutions

September 5. Introduction

Read:

- Shugart, M. S. and Taagepera, R. (2017). *Votes from Seats*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-6.
- Calvo, E. and Rodden, J. A. (2015). The Achilles heel of plurality systems: Geography and representation in multiparty democracies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(4):789–805
- Carey, J. M. and Hix, S. (2011). The electoral sweet spot: Low-magnitude proportional electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2):382–397 (*)
- Kedar, O., Harsgor, L., and Sheinerman, R. A. (2016). Are voters equal under proportional representation? *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(3):676–691 (*)

Further reading:

- Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P., editors (2005). *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. Oxford University Press
- Taagepera, R. (2007). *Predicting Party Sizes*. Oxford University Press
- Shugart, M. S. and Wattenberg, M. P. (2002). Mixed-member electoral systems: A definition and typology. In Shugart, M. S. and Wattenberg, M. P., editors, *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds*, chapter 1, pages 9–24. Oxford University Press, London
- Bormann, N.-C. and Golder, M. (2013). Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2011. *Electoral Studies*, (32):360–369
- Cox, G. W. (2005). Electoral institutions and party competitions. In Menard, C. and Shirley, M. M., editors, *Handbook of New Institutional Economics*. Springer
- Reynolds, A., Reilly, B., and Ellis, A. (2005). *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm
- Norris, P. (2004). *Electoral Engineering*. Cambridge University Press
- Lakeman, E. and Lambert, J. (1955). *Voting in Democracies: A Study of Majority and Proportional Electoral Systems*. Faber and Faber, London
- Lijphart, A. (1994). *Electoral systems and party systems: A study of twenty-seven democracies*. Oxford University Press, Oxford
- Taagepera, R. and Shugart, M. S. (1989). *Seats and Votes*. Yale University Press, New Haven
- Farrell, D. M. (2001). *Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction*. Palgrave, Houndmills
- Dinas, E., Riera, P., and Roussias, N. (2015). Staying in the first league: Parliamentary representation and the electoral success of small parties. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 3(2):187–204

September 12. The Consequences of Electoral Rules I: The Inter-Party Effects

Read:

- Riker, W. H. (1982b). The two-party system and Duverger's law: An essay on the history of political science. *American Political Science Review*, 76(4):753–766
- Cox, G. W. (1997). *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2, 4-5.
- Crisp, B. F., Olivella, S., and Potter, J. D. (2012). Electoral contexts that impede voter coordination. *Electoral Studies*, (31):143–158 (*)
- Shugart, M. S. and Taagepera, R. (2017). *Votes from Seats*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 7-10.

Further reading:

- Duverger, M. (1954). *Political Parties*. Wiley, New York. Book II, Chapter 1
- Chhibber, P. and Kollman, K. (1998). Party aggregation and the number of parties in India and the United States. *The American Political Science Review*, 92(2):329–342
- Clark, W. R. and Golder, M. (2006). Rehabilitating Duverger's law: Testing the mechanical and strategic modifying effects of electoral laws. *Comparative Political Studies*, 39:679–708
- Blais, A., Lachat, R., Hino, A., and Doray-Demers, P. (2011). The mechanical and psychological effects of electoral systems: A quasi-experimental study. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(12):1599–1621
- Alvarez, R. M., Boehmke, F. J., and Nagler, J. (2006). Strategic voting in British elections. *Electoral Studies*, 25(1):1–19
- Cox, G. W. and Shugart, M. S. (1996). Strategic voting under proportional representation. *Journal of Law Economics and Organization*, 12(2):299–324
- Moser, R. G. and Scheiner, E. (2012). *Electoral Systems and Political Context: How the Effects of Rules Vary Across New and Established Democracies*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Spenkuch, J. L. (2014). Please don't vote for me: Voting in a natural experiment with perverse incentives. *The Economic Journal*, 125:1025–1052
- Potter, J. D. (2018). Constituency diversity, district magnitude and voter co-ordination. *British Journal of Political Science*, 48(1):91–113
- Li, Y. and Shugart, M. S. (2016). The seat product model of the effective number of parties: A case for applied political science. *Electoral Studies*, 41:23–34

September 19. The Consequences of Electoral Rules II: The Intra-Party Effects

Read:

- Katz, R. S. (1986). Intrapreference party voting. In Grofman, B. and Lijphart, A., editors, *Electoral laws and their political consequences*, pages 85–103. Agathon Press, New York
- Shugart, M. S. and Taagepera, R. (2017). *Votes from Seats*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 13-14.

Blumenau, J., Eggers, A. C., Hangartner, D., and Hix, S. (2017). Open/closed list and party choice: Experimental evidence from the U.K. *British Journal of Political Science*, 47(4):809–827 (*)

Catalinac, A. (2018). Positioning under alternative electoral systems: Evidence from Japanese candidate election manifestos. *American Political Science Review*, 112(1):31–48 (*)

Further reading:

Myerson, R. B. (1993). Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems. *The American Political Science Review*, 87(4):856–869

Osborne, M. J. and Slivinski, A. (1996). A model of political competition with citizen-candidates. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 111(1):65–96

Monrow, B. L. and Rose, A. G. (2002). Electoral systems and unimagined consequences: Partisan effects of distorted proportional representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(1):67–89

Carey, J. M. and Shugart, M. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas. *Electoral Studies*, 14(4):417–439

Rae, D. (1971). *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. Yale University Press, New Haven

Cox, G. W. (1990). Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 34(4):903–936

André, A., Depauw, S., and Martin, S. (2016). The classification of electoral systems: Bringing legislators back in. *Electoral Studies*, 42:42–53

Carey, J. M. (2007). Competing principals, political institutions, and party unity in legislative voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1):92–107

Iversen, T. and Soskice, D. (2006). Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others. *American Political Science Review*, 100(2):165–82

Beath, A., Christia, F., Egorov, G., and Enikolopov, R. (2016). Electoral rules and political selection: Theory and evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan. *Review of Economic Studies*, 83:932–968

Desposato, S. W. (2006). The impact of electoral rules on legislative parties: Lessons from the Brazilian senate and chamber of deputies. *Journal of Politics*, 68(4):1018–1030

Calvo, E. and Hellwig, T. (2011). Centripetal and centrifugal incentives under different electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(1):27–41

Rickard, S. J. (2012). Electoral systems, voters' interests and geographic dispersion. *British Journal of Political Science*, 42(4):855–877

Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2003). *The Economic Effect of Constitutions*. MIT Press

Powell, B. G. (2009). The ideological congruence controversy. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42:1475–1497

Grofman, B. and Lijphart, A., editors (1984). *Electoral laws and their political consequences*. Agathon Press, New York

September 26. Electoral Reforms

Read:

- Colomer, J. M. (2004). The strategy and history of electoral system choice. In *Handbook of Electoral System Choice*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York
- Shugart, M. S. (2008). Inherent and contingent factors in reform initiation in plurality systems. In Blais, A., editor, *To Keep or To Change First Past The Post? The Politics of Electoral Reform*, pages 7–60. Oxford University Press
- Cox, G. W., Fiva, J. H., and Smith, D. M. (Forthcoming). Parties, legislators, and the origins of proportional representation. *Comparative Political Studies* (*)
- Negretto, G. L. and Visconti, G. (2018). Electoral reform under limited party competition: The adoption of proportional representation in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 60(1):27–51 (*)

Further reading:

- Rokkan, S. (1970[2009]). *Citizens, Elections, Parties*. ECPR Press. Pages 147-168.
- Katz, R. S. (2005). Why are there so many (or so few) electoral reforms? In Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P., editors, *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, pages 57–76. Oxford University Press, New York
- Blais, A., editor (2008). *To Keep or to Change first Past the Post? The Politics of Electoral Reform*. Oxford University Press, New York
- Benoit, K. (2004). Models of electoral system change. *Electoral Studies*, 23(3):363–89
- Boix, C. (1999). Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 93(3)
- Cusak, T., Iversen, T., and Soskice, D. (2007). Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems. *American Political Science Review*, 101(3):373–391
- Przeworski, A. (2008). Conquered or granted? a history of suffrage extensions. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(2):291–321
- Blais, A., Dobrzynska, A., and Indridason, I. H. (2004). To adopt or not to adopt proportional representation: The politics of institutional choice. *British Journal of Political Science*, 35:182–190
- Andrews, J. T. and Jackman, R. W. (2005). Strategic fools: electoral rule choice under extreme uncertainty. *Electoral Studies*, (24):65–84
- Calvo, E. (2009). The competitive road to proportional representation: Partisan biases and electoral regime change under increasing party competition. *World Politics*, 61(2)
- Leeman, L. and Mares, I. (2014). The adoption of proportional representation. *Journal of Politics*, 76(2):461–478
- Renwick, A. and Pilet, J.-B. (2016). *Faces on the Ballot: The Personalization of Electoral Systems in Europe*. Oxford University Press. Chapters 2 and 4

III. Information

October 3. Introduction

- Lupia, A. (2015). *Uninformed*. Oxford University Press Chapters 1-12
- Lau, R. R., Patel, P., Fahmy, D. F., and Kaufman, R. R. (2014). Correct voting across thirty-three democracies: A preliminary analysis. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(2):239–259
- Adams, J., Ezrow, L., and Somer-Topcu, Z. (2014). Do voters respond to party manifestos or to a wider information environment? an analysis of mass-elite linkages on european integration. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4):967–978 (*)
- Ferraz, C. and Finan, F. (2008). Exposing corrupt politicians: The effects of Brazil’s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2):703–745 (*)

Further reading:

- Alvarez, R. M. (1997). *Information and Elections*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor
- Pande, R. (2011). Can informed voters enforce better governance? Experiments in low-income democracies. *Annual Review of Economics*, 3:215–37
- Lupia, A. and McCubbins, M. (1998). *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* Cambridge University Press
- Lupia, A., Levine, A. S., Menning, J. O., and Sin, G. (2007). Were Bush tax cut supporters “simply ignorant?” A second look at conservatives and liberals in “Homer gets a tax cut”. *Perspectives on Politics*, (4):773–784
- Besley, T. and Burgess, R. (2002). The political economy of government responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4)
- Kendall, C., Nannicini, T., and Trebbi, F. (2016). How do voters respond to information? Evidence from a randomized campaign. *American Economic Review*, 105(1):322–353
- Grossman, G. and Michelitch, K. (2018). Information dissemination, competitive pressure, and politician performance between elections.”. *American Political Science Review*, 112(2):280–301

October 10. Media

Read:

- Arceneaux, K. and Johnson, M. (2013). *Changing Minds or Changing Channels?* The University of Chicago Press. Chapter 1, 5-6
- Enikopolov, R., Petrieva, M., and Zhuravskaya, E. (2011). Media and political persuasion: Evidence from Russia. *American Economic Review*, 101(7):3253–85 (*)
- Conroy-Krutz, J. and Moehler, D. C. (2015). Moderation from bias: A field experiment on partisan media in a new democracy. *Journal of Politics*, 77(2):575–587 (*)

Aalberg, T., Papathanassopoulos, S., Soroka, S., Curran, J., Hayashi, K., Iyengar, S., Jones, P. K., Mazzoleni, G., Rojas, H., Rowe, D., and Tiffen, R. (14). International tv news, foreign affairs interest and public knowledge. *Journalism Studies*, 3(387-406)

Van Aelst, P., Strömbäck, J., Aalberg, T., Esser, F., de Vreese, C., Matthes, J., Hopmann, D., Salgado, S., Hubé, N., Stepińska, A., Papathanassopoulos, S., Berganza, R., Legnante, G., Reinemann, C., Sheafer, T., and Stanyer, J. (2017). Political communication in a high-choice media environment: a challenge for democracy? *Annals of the International Communication Association*, 41(1):3–27

Further reading:

McDonald Ladd, J. and Lenz, G. S. (2009). Exploiting a rare communication shift to document the persuasive power of the news media. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2):394–410

DellaVigna, S. and Kaplan, E. (2007). The Fox News effect: Media bias and voting. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(3):1187–1234

Snyder, J. M. and Strömberg, D. (2010). Press coverage and political accountability. *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(2):355–408

Vavreck, L. (2007). The exaggerated effects of advertising on turnout: The dangers of self-reports. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 2(4):325–343

Gerber, A. S., Karlan, D., and Bergan, D. (2009). Does the media matter? A field experiment measuring the effect of newspapers on voting behavior and political opinions. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 1(2):35–52

Boas, T. C. and Hidalgo, F. D. (2011). Controlling the airwaves: Incumbency advantage and community radio in Brazil. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(4):869–885

October 17. Electoral Campaigns I: Styles

Read:

Bowler, S. and Farrell, D. M. (1992). *Electoral Strategies and Political Marketing*. St. Martin's Press. Chapters 1, 12.

Hersh, E. (2015). *Hacking the Electorate*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 2, 7.

Boas, T. C. (2010). Varieties of electioneering: Success contagion and presidential campaigns in Latin America. *World Politics*, 62(4):636–675

Walter, A. S., van der Brug, W., and van Praag, P. (2014). When the stakes are high: Party competition and negative campaigning. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(4):550–573 (*)

Further reading:

Marcus, G. E. and Mackuen, M. B. (1993). Anxiety, enthusiasm, and the vote: The emotional underpinnings of learning and involvement during presidential campaigns. *The American Political Science Review*, 87(3):672–685

Langston, J. and Morgenstern, S. (2009). Campaigning in an electoral authoritarian regime: The case of Mexico. *Comparative Politics*, 41(2):165–181

- Corazzini, L., Kube, S., Maréchal, M. A., and Nicolò, A. (2013). Elections and deceptions: An experimental study on the behavioral effects of democracy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(3):579–592
- Buttice, M. and Milazzo, C. (2011). Candidate positioning in Britain. *Electoral Studies*, 30(4):848–857
- Benoit, K. and Marsh, M. (2010). Incumbent and challenger campaign spending effects in proportional electoral systems. *Political Research Quarterly*, 63(1):159–173
- Crisp, B. F. and Desposato, S. W. (2004). Constituency building in multimember districts: Collusion or conflict? *Journal of Politics*, 66(1):136–156
- Snyder, J. M. (1989). Election goals and the allocation of campaign resources. *Econometrica*, 57(3):637–660
- Johnson, J. (1968). Campaign spending in proportional electoral systems: Incumbents versus challengers revisited. *Comparative Political Studies*, 3(968-993)
- Greenberg, S. B. (2009). *Dispatches from the War Room*. St. Martin's Press, New York
- Ames, B. (1995). Electoral strategy under open-list proportional representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(2):406–433
- Vavreck, L. (2009). *The Message Matters: The Economy and Presidential Campaigns*. Princeton University Press

October 24. Campaigns II: Effects

Read:

- Stevenson, R. T. and Vavreck, L. (2000). Does campaign length matter? Testing for cross-national effects. *British Journal of Political Science*, 30(2):217–235
- Kalla, J. L. and Broockman, D. E. (2018). The minimal persuasive effects of campaign contact in general elections: Evidence from 49 field experiments. *American Political Science Review*, 112(1):148–166 (*)
- Jennings, W. and Wlezien, C. (2015). The timeline of elections: A comparative perspective. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(1):219–233 (*)
- Pons, V. (2018). Will a five-minute discussion change your mind? A countrywide experiment on voter choice in France. *American Economic Review*, 108(6):1322–1363 (*)

Further reading:

- Gelman, A. and King, G. (1993). Why are American presidential election campaign polls so variable when votes are so predictable? *British Journal of Political Science*, 23(4):409–451
- Steven E, F. (1993). Reexamining the "minimal effects" model in recent presidential campaigns. *The Journal of Politics*, 55(1):1–21
- Kahn, K. F. and Kenney, P. J. (1999). Do negative campaigns mobilize or suppress turnout? Clarifying the relationship between negativity and participation. *American Political Science Review*, 93(4):877–889

Huber, G. A. and Arceneaux, K. (2007). Identifying the persuasive effects of presidential advertising. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(4):957–977

Silveira, B. S. D. and Mello, J. M. O. D. (2011). Campaign advertising and election outcomes: Quasi-natural experiment evidence from gubernatorial elections in Brazil. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 78(2):590–612

IV. Electoral Quality

October 31. Elections in Dictatorships

Read:

Schedler, A. (2013). *The Politics of Uncertainty*. Oxford University Press, New York. Chapters 1-4

Blaydes, L. A. (2011). *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge University Press, New York. Chapters 1-3

Croke, K., Grossman, G., Larreguy, H., and Marshall, J. (2016). Deliberate disengagement: How education can decrease political participation in electoral authoritarian regimes. *American Political Science Review*, 110(3):579–600 (*)

Hale, H. E. and Colton, T. J. (2017). Who defects? unpacking a defection cascade from russia's dominant party 2008-12. *American Political Science Review*, 11(2):322–337 (*)

Further reading:

Magaloni, B. (2006). *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press, New York. Chapter 1

Hermet, G. (1978). State-controlled elections: a framework. In Hermet, G., Rose, R., and Rouquié, A., editors, *Elections without choice*, pages 1–18. The Macmillan Press LTD, london edition

Cox, G. W. (2009). Authoritarian elections and leadership succession, 1975-2000. Working Paper

Gandhi, J. and Lust-Okar, E. (2009). Elections under authoritarianism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, (12):403–422

Svolik, M. W. (2012). *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6

Lust-Okar, E. (2005). *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World. Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions*. Cambridge University Press, New York

Gandhi, J. (2014). The role of presidential power in authoritarian elections. In Ginsburg, T. and Simpser, A., editors, *Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes*. Cambridge University Press

Posada-Carbó, E., editor (1996). *Elections before Democracy: The History of Elections in Europe and Latin America*. Macmillan Press LTD, London

Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A. (2010). *Competitive Authoritarianism*. Cambridge University Press, New York

Boix, C. and Svobik, M. W. (2013). The foundations of limited authoritarian government: Institutions, commitment, and power-sharing in dictatorships. *Journal of Politics*, 75(2):300–316

Reuter, O. J. and Robertson, G. B. (2012). Subnational appointments in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from russian gubernatorial appointments. *The Journal of Politics*, 74(4):1023–1037

November 7. Vote Buying

Read:

Nichter, S. (Forthcoming). *Surviving Politics*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1

Cruz, C., Labonne, J., and Querubín, P. (2017). Politician family networks and electoral outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines. *American Economic Review*, 107(10):3006–3037 (*)

Mares, I. and Young, L. E. (Forthcoming). The core voter's curse: Clientelistic threats and promises in Hungarian elections. *Comparative Political Studies* (*)

Gonzalez-Ocantos, E., Kiewiet de Jonge, C., and Nickerson, D. W. (2014). The conditionality of vote-buying norms: Experimental evidence from Latin America. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(1):197–211

Further reading:

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November 14. Electoral Fraud

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- Mares, I. (2015). *From Open Secrets to Secret Voting: The Adoption of Electoral Reforms Protecting Voters Against Electoral Intimidation*. Cambridge University Press, New York. Chapters 1-2, 5.
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- Mebane, W. R. (2015). Election forensics toolkit. DRG Center Working Paper
- Alvarez, R. M., Hall, T. E., and Hyde, S. D., editors (2008). *Election Fraud*. The Brookings Institution

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- Beaulieu, E. (2014). *Electoral Protest and Democracy in the Developing World*. Cambridge University Press, New York. Chapters 2-3.
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- Schedler, A. (2013). *The Politics of Uncertainty*. Oxford University Press, New York. Chapter 9
- Anderson, C. J., Blais, A., Bowler, S., Donovan, T., and Listhaug, O. (2005). *Losers' Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy*. Oxford University Press
- Tucker, J. (2007). Enough! Electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post-communist colored revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(3):535–551

- Arriola, L. and Johnson, C. B. Insurgents, institutions, and post-conflict elections. Working Paper
- Magaloni, B. (2010). The game of electoral fraud and the ousting of authoritarian rule. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54:751–765
- Trejo, G. (2014). The ballot and the street: An electoral theory of social protest in autocracies. *Perspectives on Politics*, 12(2):332–352
- Brancati, D. (2014). Pocketbook protests: Explaining the emergence of pro-democracy protests worldwide. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(11):1503–1530
- Hafner-Burton, E. M., Hyde, S. D., and Jablonski, R. S. (2014). When do governments resort to election violence? *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(1):149–179

Topics that we won't cover in class but that you may look into it:

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- Przeworski, A. and Sprague, J. (1986). *Paper Stones*. The University of Chicago Press
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- Manacorda, M., Miguel, E., and Vigorito, A. (2011). Government transfers and political support. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, (3):1–28
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- Stokes, S. (2001). Public opinion of market reforms: A framework. In Stokes, S., editor, *Public Support for market reforms in new democracies*. Cambridge University Press
- Cheibub, J. A. (2006). Presidentialism, electoral identifiability, and budget balances in democratic systems. *American Political Science Review*, 100(3)

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- Franchino, F. and Zucchini, F. (2015). Voting in a multi-dimensional space: A conjoint analysis employing valence and ideology attributes of candidates. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 3(2):221–241
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- Horowitz, D. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. University of California Press, Berkeley
- Horowitz, D. L. (2002). Constitutional design: proposals versus processes. *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, pages 15–36
- Wilkinson, S. I. (2004). *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- Chandra, K. (2004). *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed*. Cambridge University Press
- Reilly, B. (2001). *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*. Cambridge University Press
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